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After Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, cross-border bank lending 
contracted sharply. To explain the severity and variation in this contraction, we analyze 
detailed data on cross-border syndicated lending by 75 banks to 59 countries. We find that 
banks that had to write down sub-prime assets, refinance large amounts of long-term debt, 
and experienced sharp declines in their market-to-book ratio, transmitted these shocks across 
borders by curtailing their lending abroad. While shocked banks differentiated between 
countries in much the same way as less constrained banks, they restricted their lending more 
to small borrowers. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
After Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15th 2008, cross-border bank 
lending contracted sharply. While lending declined by 58 per cent on average, the magnitude 
of the reduction varied considerably between destination countries. Why? Disparities in the 
adjustment of economic activity and credit demand will have played a role but a curtailment 
of the supply of cross-border lending may have contributed too.  
During the crisis, many banks faced substantial shocks to their capital and access to long-
term debt. Such balance-sheet constraints may have induced them to deleverage abroad and 
thus transmit shocks across borders. In this paper we exploit heterogeneity in international 
banks’ funding constraints to examine whether this was indeed the case and whether shocked 
banks retrenched from different types of countries and firms compared to non-shocked banks. 
To do so we combine detailed data on syndicated lending by 75 banks to 59 countries 
with three exogenous measures of bank-funding constraints. We find that these bank-specific 
funding shocks contributed to the curtailment of cross-border credit after the demise of 
Lehman Brothers. In addition, while shocked banks reduced cross-border credit more, they 
differentiated between countries in much the same way as less constrained banks. We find, 
however, that shocked banks restricted their credit more to small borrowers. 
This paper contributes to the small, but emerging literature on the transmission of bank-
funding shocks across borders.1 A first strand of this literature studies how funding shocks to 
parent banks affect the lending of their foreign subsidiaries. In a seminal contribution, Joe 
Peek and Eric S. Rosengren (2000) show how the drop in Japanese stock prices in 1990, 
combined with binding capital requirements, led Japanese bank branches in the U.S. to 
reduce credit. Alexander A. Popov and Gregory F. Udell (2010) provide evidence that less 
                                                   
1
 Liquidity shocks can also constrain domestic lending. See Asim I. Khwaja and Atif R. Mian (2008) and 
Victoria Ivashina and David S. Scharfstein (2010) for evidence for Pakistan and the U.S., respectively. 
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capitalized Western European banks reduced the credit supply of their Eastern European 
subsidiaries during the early stages of the recent crisis. Nicola Cetorelli and Linda S. 
Goldberg (2011a) find that U.S. banks with high pre-crisis exposure to asset-backed 
commercial paper became more constrained when off-balance sheet became on-balance sheet 
commitments. This affected their foreign affiliates through an internal reallocation of funds. 
A second strand of the literature looks at the impact of funding shocks on cross-border 
lending. Using bilateral country-level data, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011b) show that during 
the recent crisis banking systems that depended a lot on short-term U.S. dollar funding 
curtailed cross-border lending more. Using bank-level data, Philipp Schnabl (2011) shows 
how international banks transmitted the shock of the 1998 Russian default by reducing their 
cross-border lending to banks active in Peru. More generally, Mariassunta Giannetti and Luc 
Laeven (2011) find that during crisis times international banks’ home bias increases and that 
this is especially true for banks that rely more on non-deposit funding. We contribute to this 
literature by studying the adjustment in cross-border credit due to shocks to international 
banks’ capital and access to bond funding. Our comprehensive yet detailed dataset allows us 
to not only estimate the impact of funding shocks on cross-border lending but also whether 
funding-constrained banks retrenched from different types of countries and firms compared 
to less constrained banks.  
 
II.  Data and Methodology 
 
A. Data 
To develop an identification strategy that isolates the causal impact of funding shocks on 
cross-border lending, we need data that cover lending to various countries by individual 
banks (to exploit within-bank variation) and lending by various banks to individual countries 
(to control for credit demand at the country level). In addition, data should ideally also 
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contain the underlying deals. We use information on syndicated loans that fulfils these 
requirements. 
Syndicates – groups of financial institutions that jointly provide large loans – are a key 
conduit of cross-border debt finance to both developed and emerging countries. Balance-
sheet constraints may have become particularly binding in this market as the secondary 
market for syndications, which largely depended on structuring collateralized loan 
obligations, dried up during the crisis. 
Our data source is Dealogic Loan Analytics from which we download all syndicated 
loans to private borrowers worldwide during January 2000-September 2009. We split each 
loan into the portions provided by the syndicate members and use these portions to 
reconstruct for each bank the volume and country distribution of its cross-border lending.2 
We focus on the 75 largest banks from high-income countries which jointly have a share of 
over 90 per cent of the cross-border syndications market. For each bank we calculate lending 
to individual destination countries in the pre-crisis period (July 2006-June 2007) and the 
period after the Lehman Brothers collapse (October 2008-September 2009). We disregard the 
period July 2007-September 2008, i.e. the early stage of the crisis. 
In addition, we create three bank-level funding-shock measures. First, we use the WDCI 
(Write Down vs. Capital Infusion) function that Bloomberg introduced during the crisis. 
WDCI includes, inter alia, losses related to sub-prime mortgages, structured finance products, 
and credit-defaults swaps. Losses due to regular operating activities are excluded to the extent 
that they can be separated from investments in sub-prime assets. 
For each bank we calculate the log of crisis-related write-downs during Q2 2007-Q2 2008 
(Write-downs). Write-downs were unexpected, recorded before the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy, and pertained mainly to mortgage and real estate portfolios. We therefore treat 
                                                   
2
 See Ralph De Haas and Neeltje Van Horen (2011) for more information about data construction. 
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Write-downs as exogenous to lending to foreign firms after the Lehman Brothers default. We 
expect that in the presence of minimum capital requirements, large unexpected write-downs 
limit subsequent lending if these capital requirements are binding (Peek and Rosengren, 
1995) or expected to become binding (Ralph Chami and Thomas F. Cosimano, 2010). 
Second, we use Thomson Financial to calculate for each bank the (log) amount of long-
term bonds (> 1 year) issued before the crisis and that matured after the Lehman Brothers 
collapse (Q3 2008-Q2 2009). Banks with maturing loans were more constrained compared to 
similar banks that had rolled-over their long-term debt just before the crisis. As banks made 
decisions about bond issues before the onset of the crisis, the variable Maturing bonds is 
exogenous to the crisis period (see Heitor Almeida et al. 2011). 
Third, we use Bloomberg to calculate the log change in the ratio between the market and 
book value of each bank’s equity during July 2007-September 2008. This change influenced 
the prospective costs and ease of raising new equity. We therefore use ∆Market-to-book as a 
third proxy for funding constraints after Lehman Brothers’ downfall. 
 
B.  Methodology 
We compare, in a cross-sectional setting, each bank’s lending volume in the year after the 
Lehman Brothers collapse to its lending in the year before the crisis. Our first dependent 
variable is Sudden stop, a dummy variable that is 1 for each bank-country pair where a bank 
completely stopped lending during the crisis (but where it was active before). The second – 
Volume – is the log difference of (1 plus) the amount of cross-border lending by a bank to a 
country between the post-Lehman Brothers and the pre-crisis period. 
We then test whether these changes in the supply of cross-border lending can be 
explained by the exogenous shocks Write-downs, Maturing bonds, and ∆Market-to-book.3 
                                                   
3
 The three funding measures are not highly correlated with pair-wise correlation coefficients of 0.3 or less. 
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We use country-fixed effects to control for changes in credit demand at the country level and 
therefore focus on differences across banks within a destination country. This approach is 
based on Khwaja and Mian (2008), who control for credit demand through firm-fixed effects 
in firm-level regressions. We also control for the following pre-crisis bank characteristics 
(based on BankScope data): size, solvency, wholesale funding, profitability, and loan quality. 
To control for the fact that during a crisis banks are more likely to continue lending to a 
country that is ‘close’ (De Haas and Van Horen, 2011), we also include three bilateral 
closeness variables. First, the geographical Distance between a bank’s headquarters and 
destination country. Second, Experience, which equals the number of syndicated loans that a 
bank provided to a country since 2000 and that had matured before the crisis. Third, 
Domestic lenders, measured as the proportion of domestic banks in a country with whom the 
bank had cooperated before the crisis. 
Our cross-sectional baseline specification is: 
 
)1(
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where ijL∆  is Sudden stop or Volume and subscripts i and j denote banks and destination 
countries, respectively; β1 is a coefficient; λ’ and γ’ are coefficient vectors; Fi is a funding-
shock variable; Xi is a matrix of bank-level controls; Cij is a matrix of closeness variables; φj 
is a vector of country-fixed effect coefficients, and ηij is the error term. 
We also estimate firm-level regressions on a sample of firms that before the crisis 
borrowed from at least two banks in our dataset and that borrowed at least once during the 
crisis. The dependent variable is Drop-out probability, the probability that bank i – a pre-
crisis creditor of firm k – decided not to participate in a syndicated loan to firm k during the 
crisis. We now include firm fixed effects to more precisely control for credit demand. 
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We use OLS for Volume regressions and a linear-probability model for the Sudden stop 
and Drop-out probability regressions. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and 
clustered by bank. Results are robust to clustering at the country level. 
 
III.  Results 
Table 1 provides baseline regression results. We find that funding shocks had a negative 
impact on the supply of cross-border lending during the crisis. Columns [1]–[3] show how 
international banks with higher sub-prime losses, more maturing bonds, and sharper declines 
in their market-to-book ratio were more likely to fully cut credit to a country (when compared 
to less constrained but otherwise similar banks lending to the same country). Columns [4]–[6] 
show that funding-constrained banks also reduced their overall credit supply faster than less 
constrained banks. 
The economic magnitude of these supply-side effects is substantial. For example, a one 
standard deviation increase in write-downs or maturing bonds increases the probability of a 
full lending stop with 3.8 and 4.5 percentage points, respectively (compared to a mean 
probability of 42 percent). Likewise, a one standard deviation decline in the market-to-book 
ratio leads to an increase in the probability of a sudden stop of 3.7 percentage points.  
The results for the (unreported) control variables show that larger and more solvent banks 
were in a better position to keep lending. Moreover, banks reduced their lending less to 
nearby borrowers and to countries where they had more pre-crisis experience and where they 
had cooperated more with domestic banks (cf. De Haas and Van Horen, 2011). 
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Write-downs 0.006** -0.049***
(0.050) (0.001)
Maturing bonds 0.016*** -0.084***
(0.006) (0.009)
∆ market-to-book -0.144** 0.880**
(0.041) (0.023)
Pre-crisis bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bilateral closeness controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,338 1,260 1,130 1,315 1,238 1,112
R-squared 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.30 0.30 0.31
Table 1–Bank Funding Shocks and International Crisis Transmission
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
Notes: This table shows estimates to explain the decline in cross-border lending from bank i to destination
country j after the Lehman Brothers default. Sudden stop is a dummy that is 1 if bank i stopped lending to
country j after the default. Volume is the log change in 1 plus the amount of cross-border lending by bank
i to country j in the post-Lehman Brothers period compared to the pre-crisis period. Write-downs is the
log of total crisis-related write-downs by bank i during Q2 2007-Q2 2008. Maturing bonds is the log of
the amount of long-term bonds (> 1year maturity) issued by bank i before the crisis that matured during
Q3 2008-Q2 2009. ∆ market-to-book is the log change in the market-to-book ratio of bank j during July
2007-September 2008. We use a linear probability model and an OLS model for the Sudden stop and
Volume regressions, respectively. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by bank.
Robust p-values appear in parentheses.
Sudden stop Volume
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level.
 
 
Table 2 shows regression estimates to assess whether banks that faced more severe 
funding constraints not only withdrew more from abroad but also withdrew from different 
types of countries compared to less constrained banks. We expect that constrained banks in 
particular may have ‘fled to quality’ to reduce unsafe lending, for instance by mainly 
curtailing credit to countries with risky macroeconomic or institutional environments. 
To analyze the relationship between funding shocks and destination-country 
characteristics, we continue to include country fixed effects while sequentially interacting 
Write-downs with various proxies for institutional and macroeconomic country risk (see 
Table 2 for variable definitions and sources). The dependent variable is Volume. 
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Write-downs -0.078*** -0.054*** -0.047*** -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.044*** -0.048***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Write-downs * X 0.011** 0.011 -0.004 -0.009 -0.003 -0.025 -0.005
(0.029) (0.577) (0.790) (0.597) (0.876) (0.137) (0.926)
Pre-crisis bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bilateral closeness controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315
R-squared 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
Table 2–International Crisis Transmission and Destination-Country Characteristics
Volume
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level.
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
Notes: This table shows estimates to explain the decline in cross-border lending from bank i to destination country j after the Lehman
Brothers default. The dependent variable is Volume . Experience is the number of loans provided by bank i to country j since 2000 that had
matured by July 2006. Legal difference is a dummy variable that is 1 if the legal origin of the bankruptcy law in the home country of bank i
is different from the legal origin in destination country j (La Porta et al. 1998). Emerging market is a dummy that is 1 if the destination
country is not a high-income OECD country. Weak institutions is a dummy that is 1 if the quality of governance in destination country j is
weaker than in the median country (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2010). Weak contract enforcement is a dummy that is 1 if the costs of
using the judicial or administrative system in country j to collect overdue debt is above the median cost level (Doing Business database).
Large current account deficit is a dummy that is 1 if the destination country's current account showed a deficit of more than 6 per cent of
GDP in 2007 (IMF). FX reserves to GDP measures official FX reserves as a percentage of GDP in 2007 (IMF). We use an OLS model with
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered by bank. Robust p-values appear in parentheses. Robust p-values appear in parentheses.
 
 
We find that while funding-constrained banks reduced cross-border credit more – see the 
first line – the interaction terms indicate that they did so in much the same way as less 
constrained banks. Interestingly, however, we find that funding-constrained banks are 
particularly sensitive to their prior lending experience in a country. Such pre-crisis lending 
experience partially shields countries from the negative impact of shocks to their creditors. 
Lastly, Table 3 presents firm-level regressions to investigate whether funding-constrained 
banks not only withdrew from the same type of countries but also from the same type of 
borrowers (compared to less affected banks). In line with a flight to quality, we expect that 
funding-constrained banks rationed credit more to smaller, less transparent borrowers. 
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Funding shock 0.005 0.007** 0.013* 0.019*** -0.118 -0.208**
(0.139) (0.029) (0.052) (0.003) (0.162) (0.010)
Funding shock * Large firm -0.005*** -0.011*** 0.171***
(0.008) (0.002) (0.005)
Pre-crisis bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bilateral closeness controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,671 1,671 1,572 1,572 1,472 1,472
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16
* Significant at the 10 per cent level.
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level.
** Significant at the 5 per cent level.
Table 3–International Crisis Transmission: Firm-Level Evidence
Notes: This table shows estimates to explain the variable Drop-out probability, the probability that
bank i discontinued lending to firm k after the Lehman Brothers default. The sample includes all
firms that borrowed from at least two different lenders in our sample during the pre-crisis period.
The funding variables are defined in the Notes to Table 1. Large firms are firms with an above-
median aggregate syndicated borrowing volume during January 2000-July 2007. We use a linear
probability model. All specifications include a dummy that indicates whether bank i acted as an
arranger for firm k in the past. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by bank.
Robust p-values appear in parentheses.
Drop-out probability
Write-downs Maturing bonds ∆ market-to-book
 
 
The odd columns confirm our earlier result that constrained banks reduce lending more. 
All else equal, constrained banks display a higher probability of dropping out of a syndicate, 
although the coefficients are imprecisely estimated for Write-downs and ∆Market-to-book. 
Reassuringly, the size of the coefficients for these firm-level ‘sudden stop’ effects 
corresponds closely to the coefficients in the country level regressions (as reported in 
columns [1]-[3] of Table 1). 
In the even columns, we interact the funding shock with a dummy variable Large firm 
which is 1 for firms of above-median size (proxied by the total amount of syndicated 
borrowing between January 2000 and July 2007). We find that compared to less constrained 
banks, constrained banks reduced their lending more to relatively small borrowers. The 
disparity between the supply-side effects on small versus large borrowers is considerable. For 
large firms, the probability that a bank with high sub-prime write-downs did not re-engage 
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with a firm was only 29 per cent of the probability that the bank would stop lending to a 
small firm. These numbers are 42 and 18 per cent in case of shocks from maturing bonds or 
reduced market-to-book ratios, respectively. 
 
IV.  Discussion 
In the wake of the Great Recession, the virtues and vices of financial globalization – and of 
cross-border banking in particular – are being re-evaluated. On the one hand, international 
banks may reduce macroeconomic volatility in recipient countries if the size, strength, and 
diversified nature of their balance sheets make them relatively stable sources of credit in the 
case of local shocks. On the other hand, as the 2007-09 crisis has shown, the financial 
strength of international banks can quickly dwindle if they assume large and concentrated 
risks in a few highly-correlated markets. This may impede their role as stable providers of 
cross-border credit and can cause financial crises to spread across borders, potentially 
exacerbating output declines in destination countries. 
This paper shows that international banks that had to write down sub-prime assets, 
refinance large amounts of long-term debt in an illiquid market, and experienced sharp 
declines in their market-to-book ratio, transmitted these shocks across borders by reducing 
their cross-border lending. Moreover, at the firm level we find that these shocked banks 
restricted their lending especially to small borrowers. 
Our results do not bode well for firms, such as in many countries in Emerging Europe, 
that depend on cross-border lending from Western European banking groups. The 2007-09 
crisis merged almost seamlessly into the 2010-12 Eurozone crisis and the transmission 
mechanisms highlighted in this paper appear to be at the core of the current crisis too. Large 
and unexpected write-downs now stem from exposures to sovereign risk in the Eurozone 
periphery. In addition, banks are once more experiencing difficulties in rolling over maturing 
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bonds. Our findings suggest that both types of balance-sheet shocks will translate into 
substantial reductions in cross-border lending, hurting smaller companies with few alternative 
funding options in particular. 
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